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26 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDI

ATTENTION :

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SUBJECT

:

Report of the Sixth Session of the Baghdad
Pact Liaison Committee

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Chief, CI Staff suggested that the attached report prepared by the Baghdad Pact Liaison Committee, which deals with the threat of Communist subversion in the Pact area, will be of interest to OCI and ONE. It will be extremely helpful if this report could be reviewed with a view to DDI comments on its eventual updating for the next Liaison Committee meeting which will take place in four to five months time.

CI Staff

Attachment

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SA/DDI

7 April 1959

NE/ONE

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Comment on Baghdad Pact Liason Committee Report dated 20 January 1959

1. We don't think we have anything very useful to say about this document. Obviously policy as well as intelligence considerations played a large part in its make-up. Our comments are limited to the obvious: Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I are outmoded by developments in USSR-UAR-Iraq relations. In paragraph 4 covering the threat to the Pact area, (a) is outdated and (c) is overrated. Paragraph 5 (Aims and Objectives) should certainly pinpoint Iraq in one way or another in the next edition.

2. The time factor is clearly vital in any Middle East round-up these days; any help we might be able to give on this kind of thing would be more effective through comment on a new draft when it is in process rather than in holding a post-mortem on a very dead one.

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6 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

STAT

SUBJECT : Report of the Sixth Session of the
Baghdad Pact Liaison Committee,
dated 26 March 1959

1. General: Portions of this paper dealing with the Arab states were accurate at the time it was drafted. Since then they have been outdated, and it would require almost complete redrafting to bring them up to date. The sections of the paper dealing with Turkey, Iran, and South Asia are basically accurate and up to date. A few specific comments are included below:

a. Annex A, paragraph 7: In updating the paper for the next meeting of the Liaison Committee prior to the next meeting of the Baghdad Council--probably next September--Annex A, paragraph 7, should reflect what has been reported to be increasing Tudeh activity in Tehran. Suggest first sentence of paragraph 7 be deleted and following added:

50X1

(1). As of early March, Communist Tudeh Party elements in Tehran were reported to be increasingly active and renewing old contacts. In a move apparently designed to appeal to the younger elements, Tudehists were expressing a willingness to support a "true and legitimate" Nationalist government.

b. Annex A, paragraph 18: This paragraph was true prior to the military coup of October 1958. This office has no good information that Soviet efforts have continued since October or that Pakistani editors have overcome their fear of military reprisals enough to print material not approved by the government.

c. Annex A, paragraph 22: This paragraph seems somewhat emotional and overdrawn. This office has not for some years received creditworthy information that India continues an interest in the Pushtoonistan problem. Afghan rulers deny territorial aims, though

they frequently state they wish the people of "Push-toonistan" had an opportunity to express their allegiance or desires through a plebiscite. Most recently they have seemed willing to accept even some Pakistani government recognition of a "Pushtoon" area within Pakistan. There may be some hope on the part of Afghan rulers of eventually restoring their empire to historical limits on the Indus river, but they have little practical means for accomplishing this.

d. Annex A, paragraph 24: According to the Turkish press, the trial of members of the Vatan Party began in Istanbul in February 1959. Suggest paragraph 24 be changed to reflect this change.

e. Annex A, paragraph 50: This paragraph has a somewhat erroneous slant in the last sentence, in that the USSR's new cultural offensive is probably not responsible for leftism in the Afghan press. The press has for some years had a somewhat pro-Soviet bent, possibly because of penetration by pro-Communist personnel. It has also traditionally had to rely mainly on Soviet and Chinese Communist news agencies for material, which could partially account for the pro-bloc bias it has shown. The cultural policy may well have encouraged leftist tendencies among the Afghan intelligentsia.

f. Annex A, paragraph 52: Line 4 should read "... where there is a substantial but poorly organized legal opposition." The Communists hold only a majority of 2 in a state assembly of 126. The problem is that major opposition parties have not been able to work together in sufficient harmony to defeat the Communists.

g. Annex A, paragraph 56: This paragraph might be strengthened. Communist trade union activities apparently are making headway in the face of non-Communist labor union inertia. The factual material in the paragraph is the same as that available to this office.

[Redacted]
Chief, Asia Africa Division
Office of Current Intelligence

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